Tyler Tritten
Gonzaga University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Continental Philosophy, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Speculative Realism, Meister Eckhart, Process Philosophy (Peirce, Whitehead), Alfred North Whitehead, and 18 moreMartin Heidegger, Émmanuel Lévinas, Continental Philosophy of Religion (Philosophy), Charles S. Peirce, Peirce, C.S Peirce, C. S. Peirce, Charles Sanders Peirce, Leibniz and Peirce, Peirce, Charles S., Charles Peirce, Charles S Peirce, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Leibniz, Leibniz (Philosophy), F. W. J. Schellings Late Philosophy, Schelling Freiheitsschrift 1809, and Friedrich W. J. Schellingedit
- I am an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at Gonzaga University. My areas of research are primarily in 19th and 20th ... moreI am an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at Gonzaga University. My areas of research are primarily in 19th and 20th Century Continental Philosophy, but I also conduct some research and have given some conference presentations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Current book-length projects include a text tentatively titled "Realism after German Idealism: Alternatives to the Kantian Paradigm" and a translation of Schelling's "Darstellung der reinrationalen Philosophy [Presentation of Purely Rational Philosophy]."
My most recent book, "The Contingency of Necessity: Reason and God as Matters of Fact", concerns the contingency of necessity generally and the possibility of a contingent God specifically.edit
Argues that that all necessity is consequent, and that reason and God are contingent, albeit eternal, necessities Focusing on the central striking claim that there is something rather than nothing – that all necessity is consequent –... more
Argues that that all necessity is consequent, and that reason and God are contingent, albeit eternal, necessities
Focusing on the central striking claim that there is something rather than nothing – that all necessity is consequent – Tritten engages with a wide range of ancient as well as contemporary philosophers including Quentin Meillassoux, Richard Kearney, Friedrich Schelling, Émile Boutroux and Markus Gabriel. He examines the ramifications of this truth arguing that even reason and God, while necessary according to essence, are utterly contingent with respect to existence.
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-contingency-of-necessity-9781474428194?cc=us&lang=en&#
Focusing on the central striking claim that there is something rather than nothing – that all necessity is consequent – Tritten engages with a wide range of ancient as well as contemporary philosophers including Quentin Meillassoux, Richard Kearney, Friedrich Schelling, Émile Boutroux and Markus Gabriel. He examines the ramifications of this truth arguing that even reason and God, while necessary according to essence, are utterly contingent with respect to existence.
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-contingency-of-necessity-9781474428194?cc=us&lang=en&#
Research Interests: Philosophy Of Religion, Plato, Continental Philosophy, Continental Philosophy of Religion (Philosophy), Realism (Philosophy), and 16 moreContinental Philosophy of Religion (Theology), Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Charles S. Peirce, Speculative Realism, Proclus, Alain Badiou, Heidegger, Schelling, Quentin Meillassoux, Richard Kearney, Philosophy of God, Plato's Timaeus, Contemporary Continental Philosophy, Speculative Philosophy, and Emile Boutroux
Two decades ago, Schelling first resurfaced in Žižek’s Indivisible Remainder, and the same argumentative move of redeploying Schellingian themes for contemporary ends has continued to play a significant role in critical theory since... more
Two decades ago, Schelling first resurfaced in Žižek’s Indivisible Remainder, and the same argumentative move of redeploying Schellingian themes for contemporary ends has continued to play a significant role in critical theory since (Markus Gabriel, Iain Hamilton Grant, Jean-Luc Nancy). All articles attempt to take seriously the idea of Schelling as a contemporary philosopher: Schelling is read in dialogue with key figures in the canon of European philosophy and critical theory (Alain Badiou, Émilie du Châtelet, Gilles Deleuze, Paul de Man, Quentin Meillassoux, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilbert Simondon, Slavoj Žižek), as well as in light of recent trends in analytic philosophy (Brandomian pragmatism, powers-based metaphysics and semantic naturalism) – and such readings are not meant merely to highlight Schellingian influences or resonances in contemporary thinking but rather to challenge and interrogate current orthodoxies by insisting upon the contemporaneity of Schellingian speculation. That is, the aim is both to evaluate and constructively build upon this repeated return to Schelling: to probe, to diagnose and to experiment on the latent Schellingianisms of the present and the future. This book was originally published as a special issue of Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities. Vol. 21:4 (2016).
Research Interests:
This book provides the English-speaking world with a comprehensive account of the still largely unknown work of Schelling’s philosophy of mythology and revelation. Its achievement, however, is not archival but philosophical, elucidating... more
This book provides the English-speaking world with a comprehensive account of the still largely unknown work of Schelling’s philosophy of mythology and revelation. Its achievement, however, is not archival but philosophical, elucidating the relation between Schelling and onto-theology. It explains how Schelling dealt with the problem of nihilism and onto-theology well before Nietzsche and Heidegger, arguing that Schelling surpasses onto-theology or the philosophy of presence a century prior to Heidegger. Overall, the author provocatively suggests that Heidegger is perhaps Schelling’s genuine heir and by comprehensively interpreting Schelling’s multifaceted late lectures he analyzes issues as diverse as the Ancient relation between thinking and Being, the Medieval debate between voluntarism and intellectualism, the overcoming of modern subjectivism and German Idealism as well as many themes in contemporary philosophy.
The presentation is systematic rather than thematic, following Schelling’s ages of the world through the Past, Present and Future. The results are daring, departing from the half-century long canonical reading of the late Schelling since Walter Schulz. This book is valuable for Schelling-scholars, historians of philosophy and theologians alike.
The presentation is systematic rather than thematic, following Schelling’s ages of the world through the Past, Present and Future. The results are daring, departing from the half-century long canonical reading of the late Schelling since Walter Schulz. This book is valuable for Schelling-scholars, historians of philosophy and theologians alike.
Research Interests:
This is a review of my book by Tyler Tritten.
Research Interests:
Do not cite from the version on Academia, which is an earlier draft. There is a link to the site of the journal. The first 50 people can download the final article for free. F.W.J. von Schelling’s late distinction between negative and... more
Do not cite from the version on Academia, which is an earlier draft. There is a link to the site of the journal. The first 50 people can download the final article for free.
F.W.J. von Schelling’s late distinction between negative and positive philosophy correlates negative philosophy with critical philosophy, which delimits what could be said of things without yet actually being able to do so. Positive philosophy, however, is able to make assertions about the actual existence of such objects without transgressing Kant’s prison of finitude, i.e., without moving from an immanent, subjective and transcendental position to a transcendent (read: noumenal) object. Schelling’s later positive philosophy rather asserts that one begins outside Kant’s prison. This is not a dogmatism or, more properly, a dogmatizing philosophy, that attempts to reach the transcendent from an immanent locus, transcendental subjectivity, but it is a “doctrinal philosophy” that begins in transcendence and then has as its task the consequent construction of the domain of transcendental subjectivity. By this means, Schelling’s positive philosophy, which he also deems a “historical” and “progressive” philosophy, exposes what Quentin Meillassoux has termed “the great outdoors.” Schelling, however, does not show how one might acquire access to this absolute outside, but he argues that one should depart from it. Transcendence is not the aim of knowledge but the absolute prius from which positive, i.e., progressive, philosophy begins.
F.W.J. von Schelling’s late distinction between negative and positive philosophy correlates negative philosophy with critical philosophy, which delimits what could be said of things without yet actually being able to do so. Positive philosophy, however, is able to make assertions about the actual existence of such objects without transgressing Kant’s prison of finitude, i.e., without moving from an immanent, subjective and transcendental position to a transcendent (read: noumenal) object. Schelling’s later positive philosophy rather asserts that one begins outside Kant’s prison. This is not a dogmatism or, more properly, a dogmatizing philosophy, that attempts to reach the transcendent from an immanent locus, transcendental subjectivity, but it is a “doctrinal philosophy” that begins in transcendence and then has as its task the consequent construction of the domain of transcendental subjectivity. By this means, Schelling’s positive philosophy, which he also deems a “historical” and “progressive” philosophy, exposes what Quentin Meillassoux has termed “the great outdoors.” Schelling, however, does not show how one might acquire access to this absolute outside, but he argues that one should depart from it. Transcendence is not the aim of knowledge but the absolute prius from which positive, i.e., progressive, philosophy begins.
Research Interests:
This is a draft version of a paper to be published in Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. Please do not cite from this version. This essay undermines the notion that to philosophize about or even on the basis of a purportedly revelatory... more
This is a draft version of a paper to be published in Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. Please do not cite from this version.
This essay undermines the notion that to philosophize about or even on the basis of a purportedly revelatory event, i.e. to do, in some respect at least, revealed theology, de facto discounts one from being a “free thinker.” Instead, the argument is that far from prohibiting freedom of thought, i.e. far from dogmatically holding thought hostage, the object of revelation can operate as a necessary condition of free thinking. This essay does, nevertheless, argue against the coupling of the epithet of free thought with some particular creed or doctrine, atheism included, but while maintaining that free thought cannot be extricated from something simply accepted as a given, i.e. as something simply revealed to thought rather than deduced, derived or generated from the same. More precisely, through the later philosophy of mythology and revelation of F.W.J. Schelling and with allusion to Martin Heidegger’s question, “What is called thinking?”, the idea of free thought as pure reasoning, i.e. as objectless because capable of producing its own subject-matter from itself, is disputed. Free thought is not free because it fails to be beholden to some object outside of itself, but because thinking is liberated or set at play by its object. Revelation, then, which has certainly proven capable of captivating thought as a kind of dogmatism and fetishism, might also prove capable of liberating thought. Thinking, in fact, can only become free by means of proper engagement with an object of revelation or revelatory event.
This essay undermines the notion that to philosophize about or even on the basis of a purportedly revelatory event, i.e. to do, in some respect at least, revealed theology, de facto discounts one from being a “free thinker.” Instead, the argument is that far from prohibiting freedom of thought, i.e. far from dogmatically holding thought hostage, the object of revelation can operate as a necessary condition of free thinking. This essay does, nevertheless, argue against the coupling of the epithet of free thought with some particular creed or doctrine, atheism included, but while maintaining that free thought cannot be extricated from something simply accepted as a given, i.e. as something simply revealed to thought rather than deduced, derived or generated from the same. More precisely, through the later philosophy of mythology and revelation of F.W.J. Schelling and with allusion to Martin Heidegger’s question, “What is called thinking?”, the idea of free thought as pure reasoning, i.e. as objectless because capable of producing its own subject-matter from itself, is disputed. Free thought is not free because it fails to be beholden to some object outside of itself, but because thinking is liberated or set at play by its object. Revelation, then, which has certainly proven capable of captivating thought as a kind of dogmatism and fetishism, might also prove capable of liberating thought. Thinking, in fact, can only become free by means of proper engagement with an object of revelation or revelatory event.
Research Interests:
This article provides a response to David Hume’s argument against the plausibility of miracles as found in Section X of his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by means of Charles Sanders Peirce’s method of retroduction, hypothetic... more
This article provides a response to David Hume’s argument against the plausibility of miracles as found in Section X of his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by means of Charles Sanders Peirce’s method of retroduction, hypothetic inference or abduction as it is explicated and applied in his article entitled ‘A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God.’ This differs from most approaches, which would rather focus on Peirce’s explicit reaction to Hume in regard to miracles as found in his article ‘Hume on Miracles.’ Here, however, the main focus will be on Peirce’s Neglected Argument rather than on his explicit confrontation with Hume concerning the issue of miracles. This is because, in this author’s opinion, Peirce’s criticisms of Hume demand a methodological approach appropriate for scientifically analyzing surprising phenomena or outliers, of which miracles or the reality of God would be but two examples amongst many. This article thus consists in an attempt to construct just such a method as one that draws inferences neither a priori nor a posteriori, but per posterius. A method that functions per posterius is capable of rigorously questioning rogue or surprising phenomena, e.g. miracles.
Research Interests:
This article seeks to isolate the ontological element in Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy, focusing not on the resolve, fidelity, existential predicament, mood, anxiety, religious or ethical character, or the like of a decision but rather... more
This article seeks to isolate the ontological element in Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy, focusing not on the resolve, fidelity, existential predicament, mood, anxiety, religious or ethical character, or the like of a decision but rather on the ontological status of decisiveness as such. What is the ontology of the deed? In order to extricate the ontological status of the decisive deed from these other factors it is helpful to return to F.W.J. Schelling, whose Berlin lectures in 1841 Kierkegaard attended and from whom, as is argued here, Kierkegaard draws his notion of decisiveness. In Schelling the ontological ramifications of decisiveness are not nearly as enmeshed within a network of existential and psychological analyses of the self as they are in decisiveness. Accordingly, by tracing Kierkegaard’s influence back to Schelling one is able to gain a focused view of the ontological status of the decision deed in Kierkegaard, even permitting, for better or for worse, a heretical, ‘decisionist’ Kierkegaard to come into view.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This article contends that the common thread running through all of the films of Lars von Trier is the inability of his characters to enact good works, at least as a work of their own. If the Good is efficacious in his films, e.g. in his... more
This article contends that the common thread running through all of the films of Lars von Trier is the inability of his characters to enact good works, at least as a work of their own. If the Good is efficacious in his films, e.g. in his Gold Heart Trilogy, then it is only operative by means of the effacing of the heroine herself. When the Good is operative, it is never operative as a work wrought by an autonomous agent as a possession of their own. Finally, this article will also show that the fact that von Trier’s female figures are ones who ‘suffer’ the Good is not to condemn him to misogyny. In fact, through a critical encounter with Carleen Mandolfo, I wish to argue that von Trier’s ultimate agenda is not political at all, but rather has to do with the purity of heart in a Kierkegaardian sense.
Research Interests:
This essay offers a reevaluation of Jean-Luc Nancy’s criticism of myth in his Inoperative Community as a self-signifying totality that has as its function the self-justification and self-pronouncement of a people. If this were true, then... more
This essay offers a reevaluation of Jean-Luc Nancy’s criticism of myth in his Inoperative Community as a self-signifying totality that has as its function the self-justification and self-pronouncement of a people. If this were true, then a myth would operate as the transcendental condition of the identity of a people. By returning to F.W.J. Schelling, whose account of mythology is both highly influential and greatly critiqued by Nancy, I will argue that myths are not a “work” to be accomplished by a people that wishes to found itself and, moreover, that any “unworking” of myth would not reveal any esoteric content at the basis of people, but rather that mythology is without secret. The secret of mythology is neither a doctrine of the gods nor the attempt of a people at self-foundation, but its secret is rather nothing but the fact of expressivity itself, never to be captured by any expression, dogma or myth. Myth’s secret is already its “unworking.” Mythology’s secret does not consist in what is Said but in its Saying. Mythology can thus form itself into a closed totality; myths can never say their own secret.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This essay argues for the contingency of necessity, i.e. for the contingency of reason. This essay is a rebuttal of Quentin Meillassoux’s argument for the necessity of contingency. While Meillassoux is a rationalist who presupposes the... more
This essay argues for the contingency of necessity, i.e. for the
contingency of reason. This essay is a rebuttal of Quentin Meillassoux’s argument for the necessity of contingency. While Meillassoux is a rationalist who presupposes the validity of the principle of non-contradiction as the condition of Hyper-Chaos, this essay contends that Hyper-Chaos is better explicated as a state both equal and unequal to itself at the same time. The principle of non-contradiction does not hold in Hyper-Chaos. Reason or the law of non-contradiction, therefore, can only be accrued to Hyper-Chaos as a consequent or belated necessity - a contingent necessity.
contingency of reason. This essay is a rebuttal of Quentin Meillassoux’s argument for the necessity of contingency. While Meillassoux is a rationalist who presupposes the validity of the principle of non-contradiction as the condition of Hyper-Chaos, this essay contends that Hyper-Chaos is better explicated as a state both equal and unequal to itself at the same time. The principle of non-contradiction does not hold in Hyper-Chaos. Reason or the law of non-contradiction, therefore, can only be accrued to Hyper-Chaos as a consequent or belated necessity - a contingent necessity.
Research Interests:
This essay, in explicating Christ as the copula, which is to say, the incarnation of the universal Word or Logos as the expression of God, posits that Christ is in fact not human and divine, but rather neither human nor divine, at least... more
This essay, in explicating Christ as the copula, which is to say, the incarnation of the universal Word or Logos as the expression of God, posits that Christ is in fact not human and divine, but rather neither human nor divine, at least not as such. Humanity and divinity are rather the two termini which are united by the differentiating enactment of the Logos as the copula itself, the bond between God and the human being. Humanity and divinity are thus not pre-given data to be combined in the incarnation, but they are rather the ensuing consequents. The Logos, then, is neither the subject-term proper, i.e., God the Father, who would accept the form of, i.e. acquire as a predicate-nominative, humanity, nor is the subject-term Jesus of Nazareth, who would be predicated with divinity, but the Christ, the incarnate Logos, is rather a middle term, the copula itself. In short, to say that Christ is both a human and God is neither to say that God became human (which tends toward Docetism) nor to say that a human became God (which tends toward Arianism). It is rather to say that that which is God is the same as that which is human. In this way God does not become human and a human does not become God, but that which is already a middle term, the Logos, becomes God precisely by becoming human (a monophysitism or Eutychianism that ends with two distinct natures).
Research Interests:
This article explicates face as a trace in Emmanuel Levinas in terms of the tautegorical. The tautegorical, as opposed to the allegorical, is not referential or representational, referring to something other than itself as a mere sign,... more
This article explicates face as a trace in Emmanuel Levinas in terms of the tautegorical. The tautegorical, as opposed to the allegorical, is not referential or representational, referring to something other than itself as a mere sign, but revelatory, an epiphany of the very thing itself. The face is but expression and so a smile, for example, does not refer to happiness, but it is the very manifestation of happiness. The smile is happiness. Tautegory, however, in contradistinction to the tautological, indicates an a-symmetrical and therefore not to be inverted identity between the origin, so-called, of the trace and the trace itself. Accordingly, a smile is happiness, but happiness is not necessarily reducible to the smile. The face as trace does not represent a person nor does one infer to the existence of a person by means of the face through an analogy, but the face tautegorically is the person. Now, if the face of the Other is, as Levinas suggests, the trace of the wholly Other, i.e. God, then Derrida’s question arises as to whether, perhaps, God is simply an effect of the trace. This paper argues that if the tautegorical is a proper way of reading Levinas, then the answer must be ‘No.’ Just as a person is not totalized by their face or trace as a mere effect of the same, which would only be the case if the face were an invertible and reciprocal tautology rather than tautegorical, so the face of the Other is the face of God, but God is not reducible to the face. In short, traces condition their origins as after-effects without the origin becoming thereby degraded to a mere consequence of the posterior; this is the proper way of accounting for Levinas’ notion of the ‘posteriority of the anterior.’
Research Interests:
The purpose of this article is to substantiate Agamben’s thesis that the originary experience of language as a performative speech-act, i.e. as an oath which guarantees the veridicality or efficacy of the speech-act, exposes the ethical... more
The purpose of this article is to substantiate Agamben’s thesis that the originary experience of language as a performative speech-act, i.e. as an oath which guarantees the veridicality or efficacy of the speech-act, exposes the ethical relation to language as the origination of the human qua human despite Agamben’s disenchantment rather than re-enchantment of language. This task first requires the elucidation of the seemingly magical and intimate connection between words and things, which will be proposed under the rubric of tautegory. Finally, I will seek to show how Agamben’s analysis of language as performative and anthropogenic is not just ethical, but also opens the space for a profane Messiah. Agamben’s profane messianism will be elucidated through an analysis of the Voice as the witness to the pre-linguistic.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This article has a historiographical and a philosophical aim. The historiographical and most difficult objective is to provide a comprehensive presentation of F. W. J. Schelling’s doctrine of the potencies (Potenzlehre) for the... more
This article has a historiographical and a philosophical aim. The
historiographical and most difficult objective is to provide a comprehensive
presentation of F. W. J. Schelling’s doctrine of the potencies
(Potenzlehre) for the English-speaking philosophical community as
found in his, for the most part yet to be translated, late lectures on
the positive philosophy of mythology and revelation. The philosophical
objective is to show how this same doctrine provides a
modern response to the assertion that thinking and Being are the
same, sometimes rendered as “Thinking and Being belong together”
or “Where there is Being, there is thinking.”
historiographical and most difficult objective is to provide a comprehensive
presentation of F. W. J. Schelling’s doctrine of the potencies
(Potenzlehre) for the English-speaking philosophical community as
found in his, for the most part yet to be translated, late lectures on
the positive philosophy of mythology and revelation. The philosophical
objective is to show how this same doctrine provides a
modern response to the assertion that thinking and Being are the
same, sometimes rendered as “Thinking and Being belong together”
or “Where there is Being, there is thinking.”
Research Interests:
This article presents Schelling’s doctrine of creation, primarily as outlined in his lectures on mythology and revelation. Schelling there presents not a will to power, but a power to will or not to will – the decisiveness of freedom... more
This article presents Schelling’s doctrine of creation, primarily as outlined in his lectures on mythology and revelation. Schelling there presents not a will to power, but a power to will or not to will – the decisiveness of freedom rather than blind willing. Accordingly, Schelling is able to surpass the tradition of the metaphysics of presence through freedom as an unprecognoscible act prior to potency/power. Schelling’s will is not natural but preternatural, capable of bringing forth something original, i.e. that which first becomes possible only once it has already become actual.
Research Interests:
This article responds to Merold Westphal’s assertion that Paul Tillich suffers from “ontological xenophobia.” Westphal 1) subverts Tillich’s Augustinian/Thomistic typology into a Neoplatonist/Augustinian one and 2) critiques Tillich via... more
This article responds to Merold Westphal’s assertion that Paul Tillich suffers from “ontological xenophobia.” Westphal 1) subverts Tillich’s Augustinian/Thomistic typology into a Neoplatonist/Augustinian one and 2) critiques Tillich via Levinasian alterity. In response I show that 1) Westphal has misunderstood Tillich’s notion of Augustinianism insofar as he minimizes the role of estrangement in this viewpoint and that 2) Tillich’s notion of personhood and responsibility are anything but incompatible with Levinasian Ethics as First Philosophy. Tillich’s endorsement of theonomy in contradistinction to autonomy and heteronomy overcomes both the arbitrariness of pure autonomy and the tyranny of pure heteronomy.
Research Interests:
F.W.J. von Schelling’s positive philosophy of mythology and revelation questions how one can move from the natural (the negative or mythology) to freedom (the positive or revelation), i.e. from the natural to the supernatural. The move... more
F.W.J. von Schelling’s positive philosophy of mythology and revelation questions how one can move from the natural (the negative or mythology) to freedom (the positive or revelation), i.e. from the natural to the supernatural. The move from nature to freedom surpasses the traditional metaphysics of presence. Being is not simply the presencing of nature but the result of a decisive deed surpassing and supplementing nature. Nature can do nothing other than presence. Freedom, however, could also not be. It could remain in concealment and must not necessarily presence as nature does.
The origin is a supplement because an unnecessary excess extraneous to nature. In other words, origins always supplement the natural, i.e. they are supernatural and revelatory. Origins bring something novel, i.e. something original, into being but origins themselves remain in non-being and consequently remain un-revealed. The origin cannot exist, i.e. cannot become present, because it is always qualitatively Past. The origin never was but always already has been. Primal repetition was freedom’s subjection of nature to the Past and a deferral of this deed’s consequences to the indefinite Future.
The origin is a supplement because an unnecessary excess extraneous to nature. In other words, origins always supplement the natural, i.e. they are supernatural and revelatory. Origins bring something novel, i.e. something original, into being but origins themselves remain in non-being and consequently remain un-revealed. The origin cannot exist, i.e. cannot become present, because it is always qualitatively Past. The origin never was but always already has been. Primal repetition was freedom’s subjection of nature to the Past and a deferral of this deed’s consequences to the indefinite Future.
Research Interests:
F.W.J. von Schelling’s late philosophy of mythology and revelation attempts, among other ventures, to outline monotheism in opposition to polytheism, theism, deism, pantheism, theosophism, negative theology etc. This is far from a... more
F.W.J. von Schelling’s late philosophy of mythology and revelation attempts, among other ventures, to outline monotheism in opposition to polytheism, theism, deism, pantheism, theosophism, negative theology etc. This is far from a repetition of traditional monotheism’s assertion that there is one God. Schelling asserts instead that God is one and this presupposes a foregoing multiplicity. Moreover, God is only one by virtue of His separation from being. God extracts Himself from being; He is not a being. This facet of monotheism excuses Schelling from onto-theo-logy or metaphysics as presence. Alain Badiou also attempts to avoid this critique, but via subtractive ontology. While subtractive ontology is similar to Schelling’s God as withdrawn from all beings, there are essential differences. The contention is that Schelling presents what could be termed “theo-monism” in contradistinction to monotheism as it is traditionally understood as well as in contradistinction to Badiou’s impersonal, but otherwise similar, subtractive ontology.
Research Interests:
The uploaded version is merely a preliminary draft; please follow the link for the published version: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0969725X.2016.1229412.